Walter Eltis, Emeritus Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford, har författat en rapport, "The Creation and Destruction of EMU", utgiven av Centre for Policy Studies.

Här utdrag ur Eltis artikel i Wall Street Journal 97-09-25:

… In 1996, Professor Alan Meltzer of Carnegie Mellon told a conference in Washington - whose participants also included Otmar Issing of the Bundesbank and Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus - "I have very little doubt that they will go ahead on January 1, 1999. My question is, will they still be there in 2001?"

U.S. Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan has been quoted as saying, "The euro will come but it will not be sustainable," and in May 1997 Martin Taylor, the highly regarded chief executive of Barclay's bank, told a St. Gallen banker's conference that if the exchange rates for the start of EMU do not reflect true convergence, it will be the duty of speculators to "drive them apart."

George Soros has warned that the single cunrency would bear the brunt of European anger over unemployment and is likely to exacerbate (förvärra) nationalist sentiments.

… Canada has a common currency and Quebec pays an interest rate that is almost 100 basis points higher than oil-rich Alberta. This is because their provincial governments have dilferent credit ratings. … Alberta has no responsibility to service Quebec's debt. The German government will similarly accept no responsibility to honor debt incurred by the Italian, Spanish and Portuguese governments which will continue to be entirely their legal responsibility.

If there is any suspicion of the Italian government's ability to service its debt, whether in liras or euros, its Standard and Poor's rating will fall and the comparative interest rate it has to pay will rise.

Should EMU break up, it is likely that German government debt will again be denominated in marks and Italian government debt in liras. But if what eventually leaves the euro is to be new marks and new liras, there is no doubt that the ratio of the new mark to the new lira will exceed that of the old mark to the old lira as they initially entered the euro.

If there is any breakup, those who hold bonds for which German companies or the German government are responsible will gain to the extent that the ratio of new marks to new liras exceeds the pre-EMU mark-lira ratio.

Hence, if EMU fails and Italy in effect devalues 20% relative to Germany, those who hold any German bill or bond will gain 20% relative to those who hold any Italian bill or bond.

The next rise in Italian and French unemployment could trigger demands for financial support from Germany, which will not be forthcoming, and the removal of EMU restraints, which the European Central Bank will not grant. That could result in powerful voices denouncing EMU membership, at which point the world's financial community might begin to cover itself against an EMU breakup in the manner that has been described.

This is one scenario, that must be borne in mind. There are many others. It may not happen, but on the other hand, it may.

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